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6.1 Introduction
This paper presents an empirical analysis of the retirement decisions of
Italian workers. We emphasize the role played by dynamic incentives that
are built in the social security system, which encourage (or discourage) re-
tirement. The basic idea is that, at any given age and based on the available
information, workers compare the expected present value of two alterna-
tives, retiring today and working one more year, and then choose the one
that is best. A key role in this kind of comparison is played by social secu-
rity wealth for which the level and the changes on a year-to-year basis and
over the worker’s residual life reﬂect the institutional features of the social
security system. The various incentive measures that we consider diﬀer in
the precise weight given to the social security wealth that workers accrue as
they continue to work. These incentive measures are relevant in explaining
retirement decisions as there are substantial gains or losses from retiring at
particular ages, according to the prevailing legislation. Notice, however,
that our model does not pretend to be a structural representation of the re-
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Agar Brugiavini and Franco Peracchitirement process, as a worker’s decision is modeled here following a simple
reduced-form approach in which the incentive measures enter as predic-
tors of a worker’s binary choice in addition to standard variables, such as
sex, age, and other background variables.
We use a longitudinal sample of Italian workers drawn from the social
security archive containing the information on private-sector employees.
We have twenty years of data available and can follow workers from the
moment they start an employment spell in the private sector until they per-
manently leave the archive. Hence, we can model age-earnings proﬁles for
all workers in the sample. This enables us to project their earnings forward
and compute social security wealth in order to carry out the empirical
analysis described above. Results from the estimated binary-choice model
are then used to predict retirement probabilities under alternative policy
arrangements. A basic feature of the simulated policies is to make retire-
ment (particularly early retirement) more costly or to make eligibility re-
quirements more stringent. Because changes in policy imply changes in the
incentive measures, we expect to observe an impact on retirement proba-
bilities.
Our results suggest that incentives are important in explaining retire-
ment decisions, although the interaction of age and dynamic incentives is
rather complex. In some of our policy simulations, we observe a shift in the
age hazard into retirement toward older ages and also (although less fre-
quently) an increase of the mean retirement age in response to the policy
change.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 6.2 reviews
the recent situation of the Italian social security system in terms of ex-
penditure trends and ﬁnancial viability. It also describes recent institu-
tional changes and labor market trends. Section 6.3 provides a description
of the available data and discusses the methodology and the results of es-
timating age-earnings proﬁles. Section 6.4 looks at the deﬁnitions of the
incentive variables and highlights some of the methodological issues in-
volved in computing these measures in our sample. Finally, section 6.5
presents the results of the econometric exercise, as well as the results of the
simulations.
6.2 Recent Situation and Institutional Details
In this section, we brieﬂy describe the current situation of the Italian so-
cial security system. After summarizing the institutional details of the sys-
tem before the beginning of the reform process in 1992, we look at the
steady state characteristics of the system introduced with the 1995 reform.
For the scope of this study, the transitional arrangements are also impor-
tant. Finally, we discuss recent trends in retirement patterns and review the
results of the available empirical literature.
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Figure 6.1shows the historical trends in the number of pensions (top-left
panel), average pension amounts (top-right panel), total pension expendi-
ture (bottom-left panel) and the ratio of pension expenditure to gross do-
mestic product (GDP; bottom-right panel) as measured by the National
Institute of Statistics (ISTAT 1999). We only consider expenditure on old-
age, disability, and survivor pensions, thus excluding noncontributive pen-
sions. In the twenty-ﬁve years from 1975 to 1999, the number of pensions
outstanding grew by more than 40 percent, from 12.4 to 17.8 million, and
the average pension amount more than doubled in real terms, from L7.1 to
L16.1 million at 1998 prices. Therefore, total expenditures increased by
more than three times and the ratio of pension expenditure to GDP rose by
more than 5 percentage points, from 8.4 to 13.6 percent. No other country
in the EU experienced such a dramatic growth.
The increase in the number of pensions outstanding reﬂects both the
progressive aging of the Italian population and the steady reduction of the
average retirement age, largely due to people taking advantage of the pos-
sibility of retiring with a seniority pension (pensione di anzianita’) after
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Fig. 6.1 Number of pensions, pension expenditure, average pension, and
expenditure-GDP ratio, 1975–98: Old-age, disability, and survivor pensions
Source: ISTAT (various years).thirty-ﬁve years of contributions to the system (or even less for public-
sector employees) without any actuarial reduction. On the other hand, the
rise of average pensions is due to the sharp increase of lifetime earnings of
successive cohorts of workers, a number of legislated changes that made
the system progressively more generous, and the fact that, until 1992, out-
standing pensions were linked to productivity growth.
Notice that, after increasing very quickly during the 1970s, pension ex-
penditure slowed down during the ﬁrst half of the 1980s. Expenditure re-
sumed growing very rapidly from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s when
two major reforms, in 1992 and 1995 (known respectively as the “Amato re-
form” and the “Dini reform” from the names of the prime ministers then
in charge), apparently succeeded in stabilizing the ratio of pension expen-
diture to GDP. The next subsections discuss in more detail the rules pre-
vailing before 1993 and the reforms of the 1990s.
6.2.2 The Rules Prevailing Before 1993
The Italian social security system is based on a variety of institutions ad-
ministering public pension programs. About two-thirds of the workforce is
insured with the National Institute of Social Security (Istituto Nazionale
della Previdenza Sociale, or INPS).1 This is responsible for a number of
separate funds, of which the most important covers the private-sector em-
ployees (Fondo Pensioni Lavoratori Dipendenti, or FPLD).
In this section, we describe the main rules prevailing before 1993. In
1992, a major reform was introduced, followed by another major reform in
1995, and further changes in 1997. These reforms are discussed in section
6.2.3. We focus on the FPLD fund because our empirical exercise uses data
on private-sector employees. This description is incomplete, however, as
important diﬀerences exist between the rules for private- and public-sector
employees. Furthermore, the self-employed are characterized by a separate
fund and enjoy a particularly favorable treatment in terms of both contri-
butions and beneﬁt calculation.
Payroll Social Security Taxes
The resources to the system come mainly from the employers’ and em-
ployees’ contributions. Outlays exceed revenue, however, and the resulting
deﬁcit is ﬁnanced by the central government, which has come under in-
creasing pressure to pay for pensions.
The payroll tax is unevenly shared between the employer and the em-
ployee. For the FPLD, the total payroll tax was 24.51 percent of gross earn-
ings until 1992, of which 7.15 percent was levied on the employee. This
grew to 27.17 percent in 1992 (of which the worker paid 8.34 percent and
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1. It covers the vast majority of the private-sector employees and the self-employed. Public-
sector employees are covered by a completely separate administration Instituto Nazionale
della Prividenza per i Dependenti delle Amministrazioni Pubbliche (INPDAP).33 percent in 1998 (of which the worker pays 8.89 percent). Social security
taxes for public-sector employees have been lower in the past but are now
in line with those in the private sector.2
Employees contribute a further 7.41 percent to a severance-pay fund
known as Trattamento di Fine Rapporto (TFR). These contributions are
retained by the employer and build up in a fund that oﬀers a legislated rate
of return (1.5 percent plus 75 percent of the annual inﬂation rate) and pro-
vides a lump-sum beneﬁt when the employee leaves the ﬁrm.
Eligibility
Before 1993, eligibility requirements were met when a male worker
reached age sixty (for a female worker, age ﬁfty-ﬁve) after contributing for
at least ﬁfteen years. However, the existence of an early retirement option
made the age requirement largely irrelevant for private-sector workers with
uninterrupted work careers because they could claim early retirement ben-
eﬁts at any age after completing thirty-ﬁve years of contributions.3
A feature that is important when discussing labor supply incentives pro-
vided by the system is the retirement earnings test. Italian workers can
draw a pension and earn income at the same time, but there are earnings
cutoﬀs that tend to discourage this choice. The cutoﬀs changed over time
and have been aﬀected by the reforms. Prior to 1993, private-sector em-
ployees could receive an old-age pension along with earnings only if earn-
ings did not exceed the minimum pension beneﬁt. Early retirement bene-
ﬁts could not be received along with earnings.4
Eligibility criteria and the rules for beneﬁt calculations were responsible
for the highly redistributive nature of the pension program. Most impor-
tantly, they aﬀected retirement decisions and the choice between depend-
ent employment and self-employment in a nontrivial fashion. In particu-
lar, there was a clear incentive to early retirement since no actuarial
penalty applied to early retirees. For example, a private-sector employee
who started working at age sixteen could retire at age ﬁfty-one with a full
pension. This helps to explain why exit from the labor force increased sig-
niﬁcantly over time for the age group ﬁfty to ﬁfty-nine.
Beneﬁt Computation
Pensionable earnings for private sector employees (covered by the
FPLD) were computed by averaging the earnings of the last ﬁve years
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2. While 33 percent is the level of the payroll tax used in the beneﬁt-calculation formula, the
actual amount paid is 32.7 percent. In contrast to employees, social security taxes for the self-
employed remain considerably lower; the tax rate is notionally set at 20 percent, but the eﬀec-
tive payroll tax rate is 15 percent.
3. For a male public-sector employee, only twenty years of contributions were required (ﬁf-
teen years for a married woman).
4. Note that the self-employed could claim early retirement without restrictions on earn-
ings. Also, cutoﬀpoints on earnings did not apply to this group of workers when claiming old-
age beneﬁts. Early retirement beneﬁts are reduced for the working self-employed only in 1998.before retirement.5 Earnings were taken before tax and converted into real
amounts using a consumer price index. Pension beneﬁts were then ob-
tained as the product of three terms: pensionable earnings, the number of
years of contribution (up to a maximum of forty), and a 2 percent factor per
year of contribution (referred to as the “rate of return”). Hence, a worker
could get 80 percent of his pensionable earnings at most. If retirement was
postponed, additional years of work beyond age forty did not count for
beneﬁt computation, although they were included in pensionable earnings
as they replaced earnings of earlier years. As discussed later in section 6.4,
this has important implications for the age proﬁles of social security wealth.
The system was highly progressive (and it still is) because of both earn-
ings caps (i.e., earnings entering the beneﬁt computation were capped) and
a minimum beneﬁt level. Between 1969 and 1988, only earnings up to a leg-
islated limit would contribute to pensionable earnings, while after 1988
diﬀerent rates of return would be applied to diﬀerent pensionable-earnings
brackets.6
Contributions were not subject to income taxes, but social security ben-
eﬁts were taxed at the normal income tax rates.7For all funds, beneﬁts were
indexed both to consumer price inﬂation and real earnings growth.8 The
former was measured by the consumer price index but was implemented in
a slightly staggered fashion (e.g., if the pension amount is more than three
times the minimum beneﬁt, then indexing is based only on 75 percent of the
price change). The measure of earnings growth took into account changes
in real wages in both the private- and the public-sector.
Minimum Beneﬁt
This provision of the Italian system is important for at least two reasons.
First, the number of retirees involved is nonnegligible (see table 6.4). Sec-
ond, the minimum beneﬁt is often used as a benchmark for income trans-
fers from other assistance programs. In practice, if the beneﬁt formula re-
sults in a beneﬁt level below a legislated threshold, then the beneﬁt itself is
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5. It is worth recalling that public-sector employees had their beneﬁt level based on ﬁnal
salary rather than average earnings of the last ﬁve years of work.
6. For example, in 1985 pensionable earnings in excess of €16,527 (1.6 times the average
earnings of that year) would not be included in beneﬁt calculations. After 1988, the constraint
became less stringent, but a lower rate of return was applied to pensionable earnings in excess
of the legislated limit. In 1995, a 2 percent rate applied to the ﬁrst €29,438 (again, 1.6 times
the average earnings), a 1.5 percent rate to pensionable earnings between €29,438 and €39,250
(2.2 times the average earnings), and a 1.25 percent rate to pensionable earnings between
€39,250 and €49,063 (2.7 times the average earnings). Finally, a 1 percent rate of return ap-
plied to the top earnings bracket. The generosity of the system toward low-income workers
was further increased by the minimum beneﬁt provision, that is, a ﬂoor on the beneﬁt level.
7. The principle of taxing pension beneﬁts, but not taxing contributions, remains valid af-
ter the reforms.
8. These growth rates were combined in a speciﬁc index computed by the INPS adminis-
tration (coeﬃciente di perequazione). The frequencies were every four months between 1983
and 1986, every six months between 1986 and 1992, and annually after the 1992 reform.increased up to the threshold. Until 1983, this provision could be applied
to more than one pension for the same retiree. Now, it only applies to one
pension, leaving the other beneﬁts at their original level. Minimum bene-
ﬁts are means tested. Until 1992, the test was based only on the claimant’s
income, excluding the income of the spouse. For example, in 1985, the
means test had a cutoﬀ at twice the minimum level (roughly €4,130 of that
year, corresponding to 17 percent of mean household income of the same
year). A limit on individual income still applies to singles. For married
couples, what matters now is instead the sum income of both spouses,
which must be less than four times the minimum level (approximately €4,130
in 1995, corresponding to 18 percent of mean household income).
6.2.3 The Reforms of the 1990s
Some of the issues emerging from the preceding description of the pre-
1993 system have been tackled by the recent reforms. A ﬁrst reform (the
Amato reform) was passed by Parliament in 1992 and took eﬀect in 1993.
It raised the normal retirement age and the minimum number of years of
contribution by ﬁve years, lengthened the reference period for calculating
pensionable earning, restricted the special eligibility conditions applying
to public-sector employees, eliminated pension indexation to real wage
growth by indexing pensions only to price inﬂation, and increased social
security contributions.
The 1992 reform was the ﬁrst signal of a coherent attempt at redesigning
the social security system and reducing pension expenditures. However, it
left the rules governing early retirement almost untouched and, overall, it
did not produce the much-needed short-term savings in the social security
budget.9 This partly justiﬁed the need of a second reform in 1995 (the Dini
reform), which totally changed the basic rules for granting beneﬁts to fu-
ture retirees and tried to harmonize the actuarial rates of return for early
and late retirees.
The 1995 reform goes under the heading of “virtual” funding since public
pensions are still ﬁnanced through a PAYG scheme, but each worker holds
a claim based on a fund that remains only virtual. The new system is there-
fore a notionally deﬁned-contribution system that is similar to the one re-
cently adopted by Sweden. Crucial elements of the reform are: (a) how the
accrued value of the virtual fund is computed, (b) how it is then converted
into an annuity at the time of retirement, and (c) the indexation rule adopted
for the pensions outstanding. Lifetime tax payments are capitalized at an
annual rate equal to a (ﬁve-year) moving average of past GDP-growth rates.
The level of beneﬁts (the annuity) no longer depends on ﬁnal earnings, as in
the previous system, but is instead proportional to the value of accrued so-
cial security tax payments. The proportionality factor increases more than
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9. Section 6.2.4 analyzes some of the eﬀects of the 1992 reform and of the 1995 reform.proportionally with the retirement age up to age sixty-ﬁve and then ﬂattens
out. Its current age proﬁle implies an actuarial reduction of 23 percent in
pension beneﬁts for retirement at age ﬁfty-seven, relative to retirement at
age sixty-ﬁve, and has been legislated taking into account two key elements:
the average residual life expectancy at retirement based on the 1990 life
tables and a ﬁxed real rate of return of 1.5 percent that reﬂects long-run
forecasts of annual GDP growth. Finally, outstanding pensions are going to
be indexed to price inﬂation only and not to real wage growth.
The 1995 reform changed eligibility rules by allowing people to retire at
any age after reaching age ﬁfty-seven provided that they meet two condi-
tions: (a) they must have contributed to the system for at least ﬁve years,
and (b) the value of their pension must be at least 1.2 times the noncon-
tributive pension that is paid to those aged sixty-ﬁve and older who have
no other income source (“social” pension). Besides changing the beneﬁt
formula and the eligibility rules, the 1995 reform also took a number of
steps in the direction of unifying the rules of the many schemes in which the
Italian social security system is organized.
Once phased in, the 1995 reform will imply a more transparent and ac-
tuarially fair pension system. The reason is twofold. First, beneﬁts are
more clearly linked to contributions than it was the case with the previous
ﬁnal-salary type formulae, thus reducing negative incentive eﬀects on la-
bor supply. Second, the whole workforce is now covered by essentially the
same system, thus reducing incentive eﬀects in favor of certain types of em-
ployment (public-sector employees and the self-employed). The system is
not completely neutral, however, and a number of provisions still exist that
tend to favor the self-employed.10
Table 6.1 summarizes the key features of the three regimes: the one pre-
vailing before the 1992 reform (denoted as pre-1993 regime), the one pre-
vailing at the steady state after the 1992 reform, and the ones after the 1995
reform. In practice, both the 1992 and the 1995 reforms are characterized
by a very long transitional period. For workers with less than ﬁfteen years
of contributions at the end of 1992, the provisions for the transitional pe-
riod establish eligibility and beneﬁt-computation criteria on a pro-rata ba-
sis. This method allows the rules of the old regime to hold for the fraction
of years in employment under that regime, while the remaining fraction is
regulated by the new rules. For these workers, eligibility and social security
beneﬁts are therefore computed taking into account three diﬀerent systems
of legislation. For workers with at least ﬁfteen years of contribution at the
end of 1992, the rules of the pre-1992 regime apply with only small changes.
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10. For example, the self-employed still enjoy lower contribution rates (see also note 2).
Furthermore, not all funds are aﬀected by the reform; for example, a number of special funds
for professional self-employed (such as lawyers, architects and building engineers, and ac-
countants) still work according to their own rules, although attempts to harmonize these rules
with those of the employees fund are taking place.Therefore, people will retire under the pre-1993 system until about the year
2015. During the following ﬁfteen to twenty years, an increasing fraction
of a retiree’s pension will be computed on the basis of the new system. It
will only be around 2030 that a signiﬁcant number of workers will start re-
tiring fully under the 1995 rules.
In our paper, the only relevant transitional phase is the one introduced
by the 1992 reform. According to these rules, the normal retirement age for
a private-sector employee gradually increases to reach sixty-ﬁve for men
and sixty for women in year 2000. It should be mentioned that between
1992 and 1997 there have been spells (typically lasting between six months
and one year) in which many employees were not allowed to take early
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Table 6.1 Key Features of the Pre-1993 Regime and the 1992 and 1995 Reforms 
(at the steady-state)
Pre-1993 Regime 1992 Reform 1995 Reform
Normal retirement age 60 (men) 65 (men) Any age after 56
55 (women) 60 (women) (both men and 
women)
Transitional period Until about 2032 Until about 2035
Pensionable earnings Average of last 5 years  Career average earn- Career contributions 
real earnings (con- ings (converted to real  (capitalized using a 
verted to real values  values through price  5-year moving aver-
through price index) index + 1%) age of GDP growth 
rate)
Pension beneﬁt 2%   (pensionable 2%    (pensionable  Proportional to capi-
earnings)   (t), where t earnings)   (t), where t talized value of career 
is years of tax pay- is years of tax pay- contributions, the 
ments ( 40) ments ( 40) proportionality factor 
increasing with age at 
retirement (from 
.04720 at age 57 to 
.06136 at age 65)
Pension indexation Cost of living plus real  Cost of living Cost of living
earnings growth
Pension to survivor 60% to spouse, 20% to  Same Same
each child; 40% to each 
child (if no spouse)
Years of contributions  15 20 5
for eligibility
Early retirement  Any age if contributed  Any age if contributed  No early retirement 
provision to SS for 35 years or  to SS for 35 years or  provision
more, no actuarial  more, no actuarial 
adjustment adjustment
Total payroll tax 24.5% of gross  27.17% of gross  32.7% of gross 
earnings earnings earningsretirement.11 During the transitional phase, the beneﬁt calculation distin-
guishes workers depending on their seniority and deals diﬀerently with
contributions paid before and after the reform as detailed in table 6.2. It is
clear that the transitional rules mainly aﬀect younger workers.
6.2.4 Future Prospects
So far, the eﬀects of the 1995 reform on pension expenditure have been
only minor. After 1995, pension expenditure resumed growing at rates
that, although lower than in the past, have nevertheless been higher than
GDP growth rates (ﬁgure 6.1). Furthermore, the slowdown of expenditure
growth is largely the result of decisions taken in 1992, namely the switch
from the double indexing (to price inﬂation and productivity growth) of
pensions to price-inﬂation indexing; the introduction of limitations to
early retirement; and the gradual increase of the normal retirement age.
However, as we discuss below, the changes in eligibility for old-age and
early retirement beneﬁts brought about by the reforms have not been par-
ticularly eﬀective: the elimination of the double indexation has been by far
the most important change.
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11. The 1995 reform has gradually removed these constraints. In the transitional phase
starting in 1996, public-sector employees who claimed early retirement beneﬁts suﬀered mi-
nor reductions on the basis of actuarial adjustment factors.
Table 6.2 Rules for Beneﬁt Computation Prevailing During the Transitional Period After the
1992 Reform
Case Pensionable Earnings Computation
A1: Private sector—Seniora (years before 1993) Average of last 5 years’ real earnings
A2: Private sector—Senior (years after 1993) Average of last 6.5 years’ earnings, to gradually 
become last 10 years’ earnings after 2002
B1: Private sector—Junior (years before 1993) Same as A1
B2: Private sector—Junior (years after 1993) Average of last 8 years’ earnings, to gradually 
become last 15 years’ earnings after 2002 and 
further increasing thereafter.
C1: Public sector—Senior (years before 1993) Last month’s real earnings
C2: Public sector—Senior (years after 1993) Average of last 1.5 years’ earnings, to gradually 
become last 10 years’ earnings after 2012
D1: Public sector—Junior (years before 1993) Same as C1
D2: Public sector—Junior (years after 1993) Average of last 3 years’ earnings, to gradually 
become last 10 years’ earnings after 2012 and 
further increasing thereafter
Notes: Table 6.2 focuses on employees, but similar rules apply to the self-employed. Consider, for ex-
ample, a case A worker with at least 15 years of seniority at the end of 1992. His pension depends on a
weighted average of pensionable earnings computed under case A1 and pensionable earnings computed
under case A2, with weights determined by the number of years in the system before and after 1993 re-
spectively.
aSeniors   At least 15 years in the system at the end of 1992. “Years before 1993” are the years of valid
tax payments to the social security administration completed before 1993.In order to evaluate the future prospects of the Italian public pension
system, we need to start from the available demographic projections. In-
deed, the ones produced by ISTAT for the period 1996–2050 have attracted
considerable attention in the public policy debate. They portray a rather
worrisome picture as the elderly dependency ratio—that is, the ratio be-
tween the elderly population (people aged sixty and older) and the work-
ing age population (people aged twenty to ﬁfty-nine)—is expected to grow
from 40 percent in 1996 to 83 percent in 2050. These projections have been
criticized for being too optimistic because they rule out further declines in
mortality. On the other hand, they appear to underestimate migration,
which could play an oﬀsetting role.
Besides demographics, the other crucial variable for judging the future
viability of the social security system is labor market trends. Past trends in
labor force participation, described in Brugiavini (1999), show a progres-
sive detachment of older workers from the labor force. Here we look at
more recent evidence on the labor market behavior of older workers.
Figure 6.2 shows the time series of labor force participation rates (top
panels) and employment rates (bottom panels) by age group for the period
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Fig. 6.2 Recent trends in labor force participation rates and employment rates,
October 1992–April 2000 (index October 1992   1,000)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the micro-ﬁles of the Labor Force Survey 1992–2000.from October 1992 to April 2000 and separately for men and women. The
data have been computed from the micro-ﬁles of the quarterly labor force
survey and have been normalized by taking indexes with an October 1992
base equal to 100. For men, a relatively stable labor force participation rate
(and employment rate) is observed after 1998 in all age groups. This occurs
after a period of marked decline in participation. It is interesting to note
that, after 1996, labor force participation is slowly starting to increase for
the age group ﬁfty to ﬁfty-four, while it remains at a low level for the other
two age groups. Women aged ﬁfty to ﬁfty-four and ﬁfty-ﬁve to ﬁfty-nine
also show increasing participation after the beginning of 1995, whereas
men and women aged sixty to sixty-four show a very similar negative trend.
The interpretation of these ﬁndings is that the recent reforms have
aﬀected retirement behavior in two ways. Initially, reforms had mainly
an announcement eﬀect and workers—particularly younger retirees—
claimed retirement as soon as they could in order to avoid losing the op-
tion of leaving the labor market in subsequent years. After 1997, however,
the eligibility rules built into the new system start to become binding (see
table 6.3), and workers, particularly the younger cohorts of potential re-
tirees, were forced to delay retirement.12 Overall, there is some evidence
that the recent reforms of the Italian social security system have begun to
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Table 6.3 Current Retirement Eligibility Rules
INPS (Private Sector) INPDAP (Public Sector) Self-Employed
Age and Only Age and Only Age and Only
Years of Years of Years of Years of Years of Years of
Year Contribution Contributions Contribution Contribution Contribution Contribution
1998 54 and 35 36 53 and 35 36 57 and 35 40
1999 55 and 35 37 53 and 35 37 57 and 35 40
2000 55 and 35 37 54 and 35 37 57 and 35 40
2001 56 and 35 37 55 and 35 37 58 and 35 40
2002 57 and 35 37 55 and 35 37 58 and 35 40
2003 57 and 35 37 55 and 35 37 58 and 35 40
2004 57 and 35 38 57 and 35 38 58 and 35 40
2005 57 and 35 38 57 and 35 38 58 and 35 40
2006 57 and 35 39 57 and 35 39 58 and 35 40
2007 57 and 35 39 57 and 35 39 58 and 35 40
2008 57 and 35 40 57 and 35 40 58 and 35 40
Source: INPS, Information on Early Retirement (available at http:www.inps.it) and Ministero del La-
voro, Social Security (available at http://www.miniwelfare.it).
Note: Rules prevailing after 1998 according to the Law 449/1997. These rules apply to white-collar em-
ployees, they diﬀer only slightly for blue-collar employees.
12. See also Franco (2000) for similar arguments in an appraisal of the recent Italian re-
forms.have an impact on the retirement behavior of older workers, although this
is unlikely to revert the pension expenditure trends of the recent past or to
counteract the eﬀects of the aging process of the Italian population.
6.2.5 Literature Review
To our knowledge, only three studies are currently available in Italy that
try to explain the individual decisions to retire from the labor force, par-
ticularly the choices of retirement age and the speciﬁc pathway of exit. The
problem, however, is of great importance. Take, for example, the dramatic
decline in labor force participation of men aged ﬁfty to ﬁfty-nine following
the start of the lengthy process of social security reforms in 1992. This de-
cline has been missed entirely by the reduced-form model used by the ac-
tuaries of the main social security funds, which are based on simple ex-
trapolation of the trends prevailing up to the early 1990s (see, e.g., INPS
1995).
The ﬁrst study, by Miniaci (1998), analyses the eﬀects of socioeconomic
and demographic characteristics on the choice of labor force status using
the 1995 Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) carried out by
the Bank of Italy. The sample consists of heads of households and their
partners who were in the labor force at the age of forty-ﬁve (if women) or
ﬁfty (if men). The retirement age is obtained from the retrospective ques-
tions asked in the survey about the time when pension beneﬁts were ﬁrst
received. The basic model is a multinomial logit speciﬁcation with three
states: working, receiving an old-age or seniority pension, and receiving
other pensions (invalidity, survivor, or social pensions). The paper also es-
timates a Cox proportional-hazard model for the duration of stay in em-
ployment and separate pathways of exit (old-age or seniority pension, in-
validity, or other), with and without the inclusion of the predicted value
of the replacement rate among the covariates. The main ﬁndings show the
presence of strong cohort eﬀects towards earlier retirement, later retire-
ment ages among the better-educated workers, lower replacement rates
and later retirement ages among the self-employed, no evidence that public
employees retire earlier, no evidence of a diﬀerential role of invalidity and
other pensions between the north and the south, and little evidence of a re-
placement-rate eﬀect on the expected retirement age.
The second and third study, by Spataro (2000) and Colombino (2000),
respectively, take a more structural approach. The paper by Spataro esti-
mates an option value model using a subset of the panel component of the
SHIW for the years 1991 and 1993 (namely, men aged forty-ﬁve to sixty-
ﬁve who are full-time employees at the end of 1990). The estimation
method is a pseudo–maximum likelihood based on the normality assump-
tion. He compares the empirical results with reduced-form probit speciﬁ-
cations and the original results in Stock and Wise (1990). In particular he
shows that, relative to U.S. workers, Italian workers value their leisure
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rate. He also shows that the option value model is unable to capture the
peak in the retirement hazard at age sixty.
Finally, Colombino (2000) extends the probit model estimated by
Zweimüller, Winter-Ebmer, and Falkinger (1996) for Austria to provide a
structural interpretation in terms of utility comparisons between two mu-
tually exclusive states (employed and retired). This interpretation is based
on speciﬁc assumptions about the time proﬁles of the instantaneous utility
of being employed and retired. The model is estimated using the 1993
SHIW for those aged forty and older. The empirical implementation of the
model relies crucially on the imputation of potential earnings for those
who are currently retired and on potential pension beneﬁts for those who
are currently employed. One of the main ﬁndings is that women are more
sensitive than men to the rules and incentives of the system. The paper also
contains an extension to the joint decision of a couple. This extension leads
to a bivariate probit model whose parameters are subject to constraints
and admit a structural interpretation. The model is used to simulate the
eﬀects of various policies (cut of pension beneﬁts, elimination of seniority
pensions, and complete phasing in of the 1992 and 1995 reforms), distin-
guishing between the eﬀects due to the changes in the way pension beneﬁts
are computed, the changes in the criteria for pension eligibility, and the be-
havioral response to both changes. The main ﬁnding here is that behavioral
eﬀects are small, but not negligible.
6.3 Data Description and Earnings Model
6.3.1 The Data
Unlike the papers reviewed in section 6.2.5, all based on the Bank of
Italy’s SHIW, we use a random sample of administrative records from one
of the INPS archives.13 The sample is drawn from the so-called INPS
Workers Archive (Archive O1M), which contains records on all private-
sector employees insured with INPS. The information on each employee is
ﬁlled in by the employer on a standard form containing a small number of
entries. We have a random sample of these employees in the form of a panel
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13. This is a subsample (one out of one hundred) workers born either on 1 March or on
1 October of any possible year contained in the archive. We carried out a parallel analysis of
retirement decisions using the Bank of Italy’s SHIW data. The SHIW is a cross-sectional
sample and contains a full set of demographic variables, relative to the household and its
members, plus labor market variables. However, the panel component of SHIW is character-
ized by a very small sample size and very short time span: very few transitions into retirement
are actually observed. Also questions in the SHIW survey are retrospective, and the survey is
carried out, for the relevant period, every two years. Therefore, we decided to restrict the at-
tention to the INPS sample.covering a period of about twenty years from 1973 to 1994. The sample
contains 10,000 workers entering the archive at any time during the period
considered. Employment spells can last any number of years, and individ-
uals can leave the sample and enter again in any subsequent year. The panel
is therefore highly unbalanced.
The main advantages of using these data are that they span a fairly long
time period and contain information on gross earnings (as opposed to net
earnings, as in the SHIW), which form the basis for the calculation of so-
cial security beneﬁts. However, there are several shortcomings.
1. The data set only covers private-sector employees, leaving out public-
sector employees and the self-employed. Even for private-sector employ-
ees, however, coverage is not full, and a small fraction of them is not in-
cluded.
2. The reason for a worker leaving the archive is not known: In addition
to retiring, workers could die, become self-employed or public-sector em-
ployees, or simply stop working.
3. Important covariates (e.g., education level, spousal information, and
other family background variables) are missing, and hence, we have very
few demographic controls available: we do not know about marital status
and cannot say much about diﬀerential mortality.
4. There is no information on receipt of disability or other types of ben-
eﬁts.
The initial sample selection, carried out in order to estimate suitable
earnings histories, is as follows. We focus on workers between eighteen and
seventy years of age. We drop observations for which one important indi-
cator (such as age) is missing and individuals who work less than twenty-
six days a year. We also exclude from the analysis workers belonging to spe-
cial INPS funds (nursery school teachers, local authorities, employees, and
so forth).14 In order to estimate earnings proﬁles and eventually measure
social security wealth, we further limit the sample by including only work-
ers who are present in the sample for an uninterrupted period of at least ﬁve
years (workers often appear for one year and then disappear from the
sample for a long spell). The ﬁve-year minimum requirement is motivated
by the fact that it corresponds to the minimum contributive period under
the 1995 reform. We only keep workers who do not have substantial gaps
(more than ten years missing) in their records. This is because we cannot
say whether in that time span they were engaged in other labor market or
nonlabor market activities (such as maternity leaves or undertaking fur-
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14. We could include these observations to add variability across funds, but these workers
represent only a small number (less than 100 observations) and tend to exhibit many gaps in
their careers.ther education). The choice of a ten-year interval is arbitrary and is based
on a preliminary inspection of the data.15
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15. It should be noted that, in order to gain variability in social security beneﬁts, we did ex-
periment with a larger sample including almost all workers, regardless of the existence of gaps
in their careers. However, this did not add valuable information since the majority of workers
with substantial spells out of the private sector would end up qualifying for minimum bene-
ﬁts (the level of which is ﬁxed by legislation each year) or for an old-age income guarantee
(pensione sociale). Hence, there would be very little correlation between earnings histories and
pension beneﬁts for these individuals, and the eﬀects of potential reforms in changing the in-
centives to retire would be negligible (these workers would basically qualify for the minimum
beneﬁt under all regimes). Therefore, these cases would end up blurring the results rather than
adding variability to be exploited. Finally, our choice of the ten-year threshold and the re-
quirement of a ﬁve-year minimum presence in the archive gives us an estimated sample per-
centage of minimum beneﬁt recipients that is not too far from what we observed in the uni-
verse of pension awards as recorded by the INPS Administration (see table 6.4).
Table 6.4 Fraction of Minimum Beneﬁt Awards Over Total Awards, by Sex and
Type of Beneﬁts (end of 1999)
Old-Age and
Early Retirement Disability Survivors
Age Male Female Male Female Male Female
 50 0.000 0.000 0.153 0.250 0.390 0.325
51 0.000 0.000 0.169 0.310 0.326 0.308
52 0.004 0.008 0.175 0.308 0.326 0.306
53 0.007 0.020 0.174 0.325 0.298 0.297
54 0.011 0.034 0.182 0.328 0.309 0.304
55 0.011 0.044 0.191 0.341 0.293 0.309
56 0.012 0.056 0.188 0.345 0.290 0.300
57 0.012 0.063 0.191 0.345 0.283 0.300
58 0.016 0.086 0.198 0.359 0.268 0.301
59 0.018 0.252 0.203 0.417 0.263 0.284
60 0.019 0.328 0.207 0.520 0.265 0.259
61 0.021 0.408 0.215 0.565 0.263 0.254
62 0.024 0.433 0.220 0.589 0.265 0.247
63 0.028 0.453 0.225 0.602 0.283 0.247
64 0.050 0.464 0.263 0.610 0.265 0.242
65 0.080 0.382 0.338 0.616 0.250 0.259
66 0.092 0.382 0.387 0.622 0.251 0.256
67 0.100 0.390 0.389 0.620 0.254 0.245
68 0.111 0.402 0.402 0.629 0.255 0.238
69 0.121 0.406 0.400 0.630 0.246 0.231
70 0.101 0.400 0.410 0.639 0.268 0.227
71 0.103 0.385 0.418 0.647 0.260 0.226
72 0.116 0.380 0.433 0.655 0.258 0.219
73 0.128 0.374 0.439 0.659 0.253 0.214
74 0.133 0.372 0.448 0.661 0.256 0.208
 75 0.136 0.327 0.535 0.684 0.212 0.193
Note:Authors’ calculations based on the INPS Workers Archive and Pension Archive of out-
standing pension beneﬁts. This contains the universe of public pension beneﬁts.In order to check the quality of our data, we carried out an extensive
comparison between the basic variables in the INPS sample and those in
the Bank of Italy’s SHIW, using the whole sequence of SHIW cross sections
for all available years between 1978 and 1995. Here we only report some of
our results.
We look at changes in the composition of the workforce. Table 6.5 mea-
sures the relative importance of private-sector employees on total employ-
ment and shows a clear trend towards a reduced importance of employ-
ment in the private sector and a corresponding increase in the importance
of self-employment and employment in the public sector. Hence, a draw-
back of the INPS data is that an increasingly important section of the
workforce is not covered.
Turning to earnings of private-sector employees, notice that the SHIW
only collects information on net earnings while the INPS data provide
gross earnings ﬁgures (as earnings are recorded by the social security ad-
ministration before any tax due). To carry out the comparison, the SHIW
data were “grossed-up” using a procedure based on the information avail-
able at both the individual and the household level. There exist some diﬀer-
ences in average gross earnings between the two samples: a more careful
comparison was carried out by controlling for age and cohort eﬀects. In
particular, we estimated a simple model of gross earnings as a function of
age and birth cohort, with synthetic cohorts deﬁned according to the year
of birth of each worker. This analysis conﬁrmed a substantial agreement
Micro-Modeling of Retirement Behavior in Italy 361
Table 6.5 Distribution, by Labor Force Status in the SHIW
Private-Sector Public-Sector
Year Employee Employee Self-Employed Pensioner Other
1978 44.41 12.96 15.42 25.76 1.46
1979 41.23 15.07 15.45 26.36 1.88
1980 39.42 15.22 15.09 28.44 1.83
1981 43.56 14.21 14.55 26.24 1.44
1982 42.44 15.29 17.42 23.53 1.31
1983 39.64 15.21 15.01 28.76 1.38
1984 36.85 16.56 15.17 29.37 2.05
1986 37.15 15.46 14.61 31.34 1.45
1987 45.79 6.95 7.27 28.87 11.12
1989 40.37 10.50 16.63 30.89 1.61
1991 35.02 13.16 13.23 34.69 3.91
1993 26.72 16.50 12.70 37.48 6.60
1995 26.64 15.36 13.54 37.21 7.25
Total 37.00 13.69 13.80 31.39 4.12
Notes: Private-sector employee   active workers in private sector; public-sector employee  
active worker in public sector; self-employed   a wide category of active workers working
as entrepreneurs, professionals, and self-employed proper; pensioner   self-reported pen-
sioner.in the earnings data for the two samples, both the grossing-up procedure
adopted for SHIW and the diﬀerent sampling frame could partly explain
the remaining diﬀerences.
6.3.2 Earnings Projection
The information needed in order to model age-earnings proﬁles in the
INPS sample consists of age, gender, occupation, sector of employment,
and region of working activity.16
The speciﬁcation of a model for the age-earnings proﬁle represents an
essential step in the estimation of social security wealth at the individual
level. This is especially important in Italy, as the process of social security
reform involves moving from a ﬁnal-salary type of beneﬁt formula (pre-
1993 system) to a lifetime-earnings formula (1992 reform) and to a formula
based on the value of lifetime contributions (1995 reform).17 We subse-
quently describe two additional hypothetical reforms that also involve ex-
tending the beneﬁt calculation period. It turns out that results are very
sensitive to the way that earnings projections, backward projections in
particular, are carried out. For example, what may seem a negligible over-
estimation of real earnings in the early years can have marked eﬀects on
beneﬁt calculations in the 1995 reform, where the whole earnings history
matters and revaluation of past earnings is based on a ﬁve-year moving av-
erage of past GDP-growth rates.
Three alternative earnings-modeling strategies were considered. In the
ﬁrst strategy, individual real age-earnings proﬁles are assumed to be com-
pletely ﬂat after the last year of observed earnings. This corresponds to the
assumption that, at the individual level, the real-earnings process is a ran-
dom walk with no drift. In practice, the “jump-oﬀ” point for the earnings
projections is taken to be the average of the last three years of observed
earnings. This jump-oﬀ point pins down the level of the age-earnings pro-
ﬁle for each individual.18Note that this might seem to underestimate future
earnings growth, particularly for younger cohorts, but since our “sample
at risk” (as deﬁned later) consists mainly of older cohorts, the problem may
not be too severe.19Furthermore, for ages above ﬁfty, earnings are lower on
average and very noisy, possibly because of part-time work or the coexis-
tence of early retirement beneﬁts and working activities. When going back-
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16. This is actually the region where the ﬁrm is located. Hence a comparison with the SHIW
and national accounts data reveals that there seems to be a higher number of workers located
in the northwest, where many large ﬁrms have their headquarters.
17. In this and the following sections, we only describe results for the 1995 reform; results
for the other cases are available upon request from the authors.
18. When going backward, the jump-oﬀ point corresponds to the average of the ﬁrst three
observations available for each individual.
19. The cohorts at risk are deﬁned according to year of birth: For the oldest cohort, these
are birth years between 1918 and 1926, for the next cohort 1927–1936, and for the youngest
cohort 1937–1944.ward, using a ﬂat earnings proﬁle would grossly overestimate the level of
earnings at earlier ages and grossly underestimate real earnings growth. To
avoid this problem, individual earnings were assumed to grow at the annual
growth rate of aggregate earnings, for the years when this information is
available, and at a constant real rate of 1.5 percent otherwise.20
In the second strategy, real earnings are projected into the future using
group-speciﬁc growth rates obtained from the available sample, with
groups deﬁned by sex, age, birth cohort, and occupation. We did not really
pursue this route, as some major drawbacks soon became apparent. Be-
cause group-speciﬁc growth rates are obtained using the sample informa-
tion, we face the problem that individual-speciﬁc growth rates may diﬀer
dramatically from those estimated for the relevant group, but at the same
time, group-speciﬁc growth rates may diﬀer substantially from the macro-
economic growth rate. In addition, for younger cohorts we would often get
very high growth rates going backward and very low growth rates going
forward. Finally, notice that our ﬁrst data point is in 1973 although we need
to go back to the 1930s for some of our workers in order to complete their
working history. Hence, we would be forced to use a hybrid procedure,
which makes use of aggregate growth rates when projecting backwards into
the distant past, while using group-speciﬁc growth rates for the recent past.
In the third strategy, real earning projections are obtained using a ﬁrst
order autoregressive process (AR[1]) speciﬁcation. This estimation proce-
dure did not give satisfactory results in terms of forecasting future earn-
ings. For all these reasons, we opted for the ﬁrst solution, which seems to
be the safest. Notice that in projecting earnings forward, individuals are
assumed to form expectations by using the model—in other words, for
each age, we only use actual earnings up to that age and project earnings
from that age forward according to the forecasting model.
6.3.3 Transitions into Retirement
The INPS sample contains no information on the reasons for leaving
the archive. Thus, in order to use these data, we have to make the strong
assumption that every exit from the archive is due to retirement. In fact,
rather than retiring, a worker could have died or moved from private-sector
employment to public-sector employment or to self-employment. Our
identifying assumption is that, for the range of ages that we consider (from
age ﬁfty to sixty-ﬁve), exit from the INPS archive is due to retirement and
not to other reasons.
This assumption is backed up by what we observe in the SHIW sample,
which has available the full set of information concerning the occupational
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20. Aggregate earnings are equal to the earnings series put together by Rossi, Sorgato, and
Toniolo (1993) for the years before 1970 and to national account statistics for subsequent
years up to 1999.status in each year.21 Table 6.6 shows the transitions observed in the panel
component of the SHIW sample for the years 1989, 1991, 1993, and 1995.
Each entry of the table gives the proportion of transitions as a percentage
of the observations in that age group starting from the sample of workers
in 1989. First, it is apparent that, after age ﬁfty-four, the transitions into
retirement are substantial. Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of
transitions are from work to retirement, very few cases of transitions from
work to disability are observed and only some cases from disability to re-
tirement.22 We do not report transitions from retirement back into the la-
bor force as these are basically nonexistent, and we can safely assume that
retirement is an absorbing state.
This evidence suggests that, for Italian workers, the only relevant alter-
native escape route from the labor force is via disability. Many other “soft-
landing” or bridging plans exist, but they would all fall in the category of
preretirement or early retirement, and in our data, they would eﬀectively
correspond to retirement.23 As far as disability beneﬁts are concerned, af-
ter the changes legislated in 1984, their importance as an escape route has
greatly diminished.24 This is shown quite clearly in ﬁgure 6.3, which pre-
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21. In the SHIW sample, diﬀerent deﬁnitions of pensioner are available based on self-
reported occupational status, on earnings, and on beneﬁts receipts. However, no marked diﬀer-
ence in the distribution of retired people by age emerged from adopting diﬀerent deﬁnitions.
22. A disability pension is automatically converted into an old-age pension when the re-
cipient reaches the age of eligibility.
23. For example, in the SHIW sample we do know about disability insurance, but early re-
tirement and preretirement are recorded as retirement.
24. The fall in disability beneﬁts out of total beneﬁts occurring after 1984 is documented in
Brugiavini (1999).
Table 6.6 Transitions Observed in the SHIW Panel Sample, by Age (%)
From Work From Work From Disability
Age to Retirement to Disability to Retirement
50 6.11 0.27 0.27
51 11.79 0.00 2.85
52 10.12 0.77 0.00
53 9.03 0.28 0.00
54 2.22 0.56 0.85
55 15.03 1.12 0.56
56 17.46 1.04 0.78
57 20.16 0.25 1.03
58 32.65 0.53 1.59
59 22.07 0.00 1.91
60 18.51 0.28 1.41
61 15.78 0.50 2.79
62 36.66 0.00 2.08
63 40.74 0.00 1.51
64 76.47 0.22 1.83sents the number of new pension awards in 1997 (ﬂow data) and the num-
ber of outstanding pensions at the end of 1997 (stock data). The data,
kindly provided by ISTAT, are tabulations based on the INPS Pensions
Archive and are broken down by sex and age of the beneﬁciary and by type
of pension (old-age and early retirement, survivors, and disability).25In the
age range that we consider—ﬁfty to seventy—the number of disability
pensions is clearly negligible relative to old-age pensions, especially in the
case of new awards (ﬂow data). Disability becomes important relative to
old-age pensions only if we consider the stock of pensions at ages above
sixty-ﬁve, which reﬂects the very generous policy followed until the mid-
1980s, a period that we do not model in this paper.
Finally, ﬁgure 6.4 presents two descriptions of the retirement hazard
based on the INPS sample. The ﬁrst is a nonparametric estimate based on
the raw data, which shows sharp peaks at age sixty and age sixty-ﬁve and
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Fig. 6.3 Flow of new pensions in 1997 and stock of existing pensions at the end of
1997 (in thousands) by sex and age of the beneﬁciary and type of pension
Note: Figures are based on the INPS Archive of Outstanding Pension Beneﬁts. This contains
the universe of public pension beneﬁts.
25. The INPS pensions archive contains all outstanding pensions paid out by the INPS
fund and by the other public funds, including the public-sector employees fund and the local
authorities employees fund. This archive contains the universe of all public pension beneﬁts.substantial exit already at age ﬁfty. The second is a semiparametric esti-
mate of the baseline hazard in a proportional hazard model with a number
of basic demographic variables introduced as covariates that proportion-
ally shift the baseline hazard. For men there is an important spike at age
sixty, but a lot of action also at other ages, whereas for women there are sev-
A
B
Fig. 6.4 Hazard functions: A, Men; B, Women
Note: Each picture shows two hazard functions. The nonparametric hazard is the one ob-
tained from the raw hazard by simply relating the ﬂow into retirement at each age to the stock
of workers of that age. The baseline Cox hazard is obtained by using Cox proportional-hazard
model with age as the only explanatory variable.
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bor force peaks.
6.4 Social Security Wealth and Incentive Measures
Section 6.4.1 reminds the reader of the deﬁnition of social security
wealth and the related incentive measures used in the econometric appli-
cation. Section 6.4.2 lists our basic assumptions in the calculation of social
security wealth, whereas section 6.4.3 describes the social security regimes
modeled in the simulations.
6.4.1 Deﬁnition of Social Security Wealth and Incentive Measures
For a worker of age a, we deﬁne social security wealth (SSW) in case of
retirement at age h aas the expected present value of future pension ben-
eﬁts




where S is the age of certain death,  s    s–a s is a discount factor that de-
pends on the rate of time discount   and the survival probability  s at age
s conditional on being alive at age h, and B(h) is the pension beneﬁt ex-
pected at age s   h   1 in case of retirement at age h. Pension beneﬁts are
net of income taxes. Given the SSW, we deﬁne three incentive measures for
a worker of age a.
First, social security accrual (SSA) is the diﬀerence in SSW due to post-
poning retirement from age a to age a   1,
SSAa   SSW a 1   SSW a   ∑
S
s a 2
 s[Bs(a   1)   Bs(a)]    a 1Ba 1(a).
The SSA is negative if the expected present value of pension beneﬁts fore-
gone by postponing retirement by one year is greater than ΣS
s a 2 s[Bs(a  
1) – Bs(a)], the expected present value of the increment in the ﬂow of pen-
sion beneﬁts. The rescaled negative accrual  a   –SSAa/W a 1, where W a 1
are expected net earnings at age a   1 based on the information available
up to age a, is called the implicit tax or subsidy of postponing retirement
from age a to age a   1.
Second, peak value is PV a   maxh(SSW h – SSW a), h   a   1, . . . , R,
where R is the mandatory retirement age (the latter does not exist in Italy,
but given the retirement evidence, we ﬁnd it reasonable to put R equal to
70). Thus, the peak value is the maximum diﬀerence in SSW between re-
tiring at future ages and retiring at the current age.
Third, option value is OV a   maxh(V h – V a), h   a   1, . . . , R, where
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is the intertemporal utility of retiring at age h   a. Thus, the option value
is the maximum utility diﬀerence between retiring at future ages and retir-
ing at age a. We parameterize the model by   equals 1 and k equals 1.25.
Under these assumptions, V a   1.25 SSW a and




    1.25SSW h.
If expected earnings are constant at W a (as assumed in our earnings
model), then
V h – V a   W a ∑
h
s a 1
 s   1.25(SSW h – SSW a).
That is, the peak value and the option value are proportional to each other
except for the eﬀect due to the term Σh
s a 1 s.
These three incentive measures are consistent with the view that, in de-
ciding whether or not to retire, a worker compares the expected gain from
each of the two alternatives. Note that, in computing the incentive mea-
sures, we used the assumption that workers revise their expectations at
each age. Hence for each given age, a worker projects the path of observed
earnings according to the model and then computes their SSW and the in-
centive variables, taking into account the information currently available.
This requires recomputing SSW and the corresponding incentive measures
for each year until retirement. Reforms are assumed to come as a surprise
to workers.
As is clear from the above formula, the social security accrual depends
crucially on the expected present value  s[Bs(a   1) – Bs(a)] of the incre-
ment in pension beneﬁts at age s resulting from postponing retirement by
one year. Let t denote the number of years of contributions for a worker of
age a, and assume that pension beneﬁts remain constant in real terms. Un-
der the pre-1993 regime (but also during the transitional period that we as-
sume as the baseline regime), if t   40 then
Bs(a   1)   Bs(a)   0.02t[W  (a   1)   W  (a)]   0.02W  (a   1),
where W  (a) denotes pensionable earnings in case of retirement at age a;
whereas if t   40, then
Bs(a   1)   Bs(a)   0.8[W  (a   1)   W  (a)].
In the special case when W  (a   1)   W  (a)   W  , we obtain
Bs(a   1)   Bs(a)   
0.02W  , t   40
0, otherwise.
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Bs(a   1)   Bs(a)   (a   1)M(a   1)   (a)M(a),
where  (a) represents the legislated conversion factor used to transform
the worker’s “notional account” into a pension annuity, and M(a) denotes
the value of such a notional fund in case of retirement at age a. If the ﬁve-
year moving average of GDP growth rates (used to capitalize past earn-
ings) is positive, then the diﬀerence [Bs(a 1) – Bs(a)] is always positive be-
cause M(a   1)   M(a) and  (a   1)   (a), (with equality for a   65).
Note that, for many ages and under most regimes, SSW is a monotoni-
cally decreasing function of age. In all these cases, the maximum value of
SSW over current and future years is attained at the current age. Therefore,
once the eligibility criteria are met, the age proﬁle of the peak value looks
very similar to the age proﬁle of the accrual. This explains why the pictures
portraying the age proﬁle of the peak value and the accrual look often sim-
ilar (see section 6.4.2). We do have cases, however, of local maxima (e.g.,
under the 1995 reform).
6.4.2 Basic Assumptions and Calculation of Social Security Wealth
In the actual calculation of SSW, we assume a real discount factor of 1.5
percent (  equals 0.985). Beneﬁts are deﬁned in real terms and the indexa-
tion rules prevailing under each legislation are implemented (e.g., before
the 1992 reform, we apply indexation to both price inﬂation and real
wages). We also assume that real earnings growth after 1994 (the last year
of the INPS sample) is constant at 1.5 percent. We carry out calculations
as follows.
1. We estimate SSW for men and women separately.
2. Unlike most other countries in this project, we assume that workers
are single. In fact, from the data, we are unable to tell whether or not a
worker has a spouse. In the Italian legislation, the only major diﬀerence be-
tween a single worker and a married worker is eligibility to survivors’ pen-
sion (there is no dependent-spouse beneﬁt26). We did not attempt an im-
putation procedure to assign workers a spouse.27
3. Disability beneﬁts have not been taken into account because multiple
exit routes are not relevant in the Italian case. We experimented with
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26. There is a diﬀerence in the rebates on income tax and in the calculation of minimum
beneﬁt, particular in the way in which means testing is carried out.
27. We could readily generalize our calculations to include pensions to a surviving spouse.
For example, we could randomly assign to men a wife who is three years younger. However,
this imputation would not produce extra variability in SSW, because pension wealth of sur-
vivors depends on the characteristics of the deceased and on the survivor’s age. Hence, in or-
der to have an impact on the variability of the proﬁle of SSW by age, we should also assign
randomly the age of the imputed wife, which may produce a considerable amount of noise for
a little gain.adding this alternative exit route in an ad hoc fashion by using the observed
disability probabilities, but this had no eﬀect on the main ﬁndings.
4. We do not account for the lump-sum beneﬁt represented by the TFR,
since the paper by Brugiavini (1999) shows that this lump sum beneﬁt does
not alter dynamic incentives.
5. We assume variation in mortality only by sex and age.
6. We look at all individuals considered at risk (i.e., aged ﬁfty to sev-
enty).
Note that, in our sample, the ﬁrst worker who becomes eligible for re-
tirement under the baseline regime is aged ﬁfty, and the econometric ap-
plication makes use of the full range of ages between ﬁfty and seventy.
However, since there are very few exits until age ﬁfty-two and very few in-
dividuals working after age sixty-ﬁve, in some tabulations (e.g., table 6A.1
in the appendix) we present results starting at age ﬁfty-three and group in
a single age interval all workers aged sixty-ﬁve and over.
In estimating the model, we also had to deal with the fact that the actual
age of entry into the labor market is not always known. We used the infor-
mation on the initial occupational level to get a reasonable proxy for edu-
cational attainments. This was then used to impute an initial age for the
worker’s contributive history.
Eligibility rules and beneﬁt computation rules prevailing under each
regime are rather complex (see section 6.2), and some shortcuts were made.
Finally, we computed SSW net of income tax, by subtracting from gross
pension beneﬁts income taxes as due.
6.4.3 Social Security Regimes Modeled in the Simulation
We  estimate SSW and incentive variables under ﬁve alternative re-
gimes:28
1. The rules prevailing before 1993;
2. The rules actually prevailing during the transitional phase that starts
in 1993, and this case represents our baseline;
3. The rules prevailing in the steady state, once the 1995 reform is fully
phased in;
4. Policy simulation 1 in which, starting from the current system (the
baseline case), we raise the normal retirement age by three years while
holding constant all other features; and
5. Policy simulation 2, which entails a diﬀerent pension program alto-
gether that features an early retirement age of sixty and a normal retire-
ment age of sixty-ﬁve. It provides a retiree with a beneﬁt replacing 60 per-
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28. We actually also simulated the rules prevailing after 1992 in the steady state once the
Amato reform is fully phased in. But, since this case is only of theoretical interest and the 1992
reform will never reach its steady state values as subsequent changes took place in 1995 and
1997, we did not report results for this case.cent of their projected earnings when they turn sixty-ﬁve. It applies an ac-
tuarial reduction of 6 percent per year for early claiming and an actuarial
increase of 6 percent per year for later claiming. It essentially makes early
retirement costly and introduces age neutrality in retirement choices.
To simplify the presentation, we only report the results obtained for the
baseline, the 1995 reform, and the two policy simulations.
Table 6A.1 of the appendix presents descriptive statistics (mean, stan-
dard deviation, and selected percentiles) for the three incentive measures.
In the baseline case, eligibility is reached very early and SSW tends to de-
crease monotonically after the eligibility age. By comparing the two initial
panels of table 6A.1, one has a ﬁrst impression of the eﬀects of the 1995 re-
form: under the post-1995 regime, SSW becomes positive only late in life,
and median SSW is lower. We also report descriptive statistics for the im-
plicit tax on work, an incentive measure that was used extensively in Gru-
ber and Wise (1999). On average, the estimated implicit tax in our sample
is fairly close to the one obtained for a reference individual in the Gruber
and Wise study.29In particular, taking the comparable case of a single male
worker under the pre-1993 legislation, the average implicit tax of the
sample is in line with the one computed in Brugiavini (1999), but it diﬀers
substantially at the two crucial ages of sixty and sixty-ﬁve.
Figures 6.5 through to 6.8 complement this information by presenting
nonparametric estimates of the density for each incentive measure and for
SSW. This is done ﬁrst under diﬀerent policy regimes separately for men
and women (ﬁgures 6.5 and 6.6) and then at selected ages for men only (ﬁg-
ures 6.7to 6.8). These estimates have been computed by the kernel method
using only the observations with a positive value of the SSW. The eﬀects of
the reform on the density of the relevant variables produced by the policy
simulation 1 (three-year delay) are negligible, and we do not report them in
these graphs. The 1995 reform and the policy simulation 2 (actuarial ad-
justment) have a more marked impact. For men, both reforms imply a shift
to the left of the distribution of SSW (see ﬁgure 6.5) and, hence, a lower
mean and no substantial change in dispersion. However accrual and peak
values show a substantial change in the level of concentration around the
mean as a result of the reforms, while the option value exhibits an interest-
ing bimodal shape. For women, as a result of the reforms, there are more
important changes in the location and dispersion of all variables, includ-
ing SSW. For men, we also look at the distribution of SSW and all incen-
tive measures for a few selected ages. These distributions are much more
sensitive to age under the baseline than under the reforms. This conﬁrms
the point that the pre-1993 legislation (essentially the baseline) was highly
non-neutral with respect to age.
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29. In the Gruber and Wise study (1999; see Brugiavini 1999 for Italy) the reference indi-
vidual is basically a worker characterized by the median earnings of his cohort.6.5 Modeling Retirement Choices
In this section we present the results of modeling exit into retirement us-
ing probit models that include, in addition to a standard set of covariates
(such as age, occupation, and sector), the incentive measures discussed in
the previous section. Table 6.7 provides mean values and standard devia-
tions of the relevant variables.
6.5.1 Probability of Retirement
We present two tables of probit estimates, one for men (table 6.8) and
one for women (table 6.9). In either case, the response variable is a binary
indicator, representing exit from the INPS sample between the year t and
the year t   1. As discussed in section 6.4, we assume that exit from the
INPS sample corresponds to retirement. The population at risk consists of
workers aged between ﬁfty and seventy in any of the relevant years. The
sample used for estimation includes all pairs of years from 1980 to 1981
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Fig. 6.5 Kernel-estimated density of social security wealth and incentives (SSW in
1998 euro   104), men
Note:We do not show the results for the plus-three-years reform as these almost entirely over-
lap with the baseline densities.through 1993 to 1994. Because in some cases we have to model earnings
proﬁles going back ﬁfty years, given the existing limitations on aggregate
wage data, we restrict the analysis to individuals at risk after 1980. In this
way, our oldest worker is aged seventy in 1980, and we only need to back-
cast earnings to the year 1930.30
For each incentive measure, two basic speciﬁcations are considered for
a total of six estimated models. The ﬁrst column of each table corresponds
to the use of the accrual as the incentive measure and shows the results ob-
tained for a general speciﬁcation that includes, in addition to accrual and
SSW, a set of sectoral and regional indicators, a linear age term, and a set
of earnings measures relevant for the retirement choice (i.e., a quadratic
polynomial in expected earnings and a quadratic polynomial in pension-
able earnings). It should be noted that, for all ages, expected earnings in the
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Fig. 6.6 Kernel-estimated density of social security wealth and incentives (SSW in
1998 euro   104):Women
Note:We do not show the results for the plus-three-years reform as these almost entirely over-
lap with the baseline densities.
30. Retirement is not mandatory. Given that we assume an individual at risk up to age sev-
enty and given that we cannot exclude that they started working at age twenty, we cannot rule
out the possibility that this individual worked for ﬁfty years.next period are computed based on the projection model and the informa-
tion available to the worker at that age. We refer to this as model M1. The
second column shows the results for a speciﬁcation in which the eﬀect of
age is modeled through a set of age dummies, rather than a linear age term,
while the rest of the speciﬁcation is unchanged; we refer to this as model
M2. The same pattern is repeated for the other columns: columns (3) and
(4) correspond to the use of the peak value with, respectively, a linear age
trend (model M1) and a set of age dummies (model M2), while columns (5)
and (6) correspond to the use of the option value. Since coeﬃcients from a
probit analysis do not have an immediate interpretation, we also provide
the probability eﬀect of the relevant variables. These are shown underneath
the coeﬃcient estimated for SSW and for each incentive variable. Since the
scale of each of these variables diﬀers, we measure the probability eﬀect
(for the reference individual) by increasing the variable of interest from the
mean level to the level of the mean plus one standard deviation, holding the
other variables constant.
In our baseline speciﬁcation, SSW and all incentive measures are com-
puted according to the transitional rules introduced after 1992. This rep-
resents the relevant regime for the workers in our sample. Overall, using
374 Agar Brugiavini and Franco Peracchi














































































































































































































































































mTable 6.7 Summary Statistics of Variables Used in the Probit Analysis
Women Men
Variable Mean SD Mean SD
Year 87.74 4.07 87.14 4.17
Age 53.06 3.51 53.80 3.62
No. of jobs held 0.58 1.11 0.91 1.58
Industry dummy 0.47 0.49 0.50 0.49
Agriculture dummy 0 0 0.01 0.10
Building dummy 0.00 0.08 0.11 0.31
Trade dummy 0.14 0.35 0.08 0.27
Transport dummy 0.02 0.15 0.09 0.29
Financial dummy 0.03 0.17 0.04 0.20
Other sector dummies 0.30 0.46 0.14 0.35
Earnings 13,736.26 52.88 18,953.01 14,495.15
Years of contribution 32.44 3.93 33.12 4.43
SSW
Baseline 0.52 0.79 0.53 0.73
1995-ref 0.17 0.45 0.27 0.56
S1 0.22 0.56 0.25 0.55
S2 0.07 0.28 0.07 0.29
Option value
Base 236.93 179.69 269.36 240.63
Ref 312.23 176.62 343.64 260.39
S1 290.92 173.39 313.94 239.15
S2 306.90 162.65 335.34 232.58
Peak value
Baseline 101.84 86.03 87.60 82.20
1995-ref 118.09 63.71 106.36 78.42
S1 137.40 72.49 115.64 74.77
S2 113.16 43.15 98.40 48.71
Accrual
Baseline –2.00 7.27 –2.02 6.32
1995-ref 0.27 1.36 0.34 2.51
S1 –0.72 3.87 –1.11 4.32
S2 –0.01 1.75 –0.15 2.85
Retirement dummy 0.12 0.33 0.11 0.31
Northwest 0.45 0.49 0.38 0.48
Northeast 0.21 0.41 0.22 0.41
Center 0.27 0.44 0.21 0.41
South 0.04 0.19 0.11 0.32
Islands 0.01 0.12 0.05 0.22
Blue-collar 0.62 0.48 0.73 0.44
White-collar 0.32 0.46 0.23 0.42
Manager 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.17
Other levels 0.04 0.20 0.00 0.04
Note: SD = standard deviation. Earnings are in 1998 euros; SSW is in 1998 euro   (106). SSW
and incentive variables are distinguished according to the baseline case, the 1995 reform, and





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.instead the pre-1993 rules leads to negligible diﬀerences in terms of SSW
and eligibility for our sample of workers. This is because, as already men-
tioned, the rights of workers near retirement were changed only marginally
by the reforms of the 1990s.
All the speciﬁcations are satisfactory in terms of explaining variability in
the data, as indicated by pseudo R2 values ranging between 32 and 34 per-
cent. The use of age dummies increases the ﬁt relative to the model with a
linear age term, but only marginally. This suggests that age is an important
determinant of retirement decisions but, despite the presence of impressive
spikes in the hazard, we get only marginal gains by making use of a fully
parameterized model. Hence, these spikes may be less important than they
ﬁrst appear in explaining the age-retirement process, as most of the action
comes from the exits taking place between age ﬁfty and age sixty. For men,
the accrual is the only incentive variable that is statistically signiﬁcant and
has the expected negative sign. For women, instead, the incentive variables
have the expected sign and are signiﬁcant, at least for the speciﬁcations
with age dummies. For the estimates based on the accrual, we also ﬁnd a
nonnegligible probability eﬀect of the incentive variable (a one-percent in-
crease in the accrual decreases the retirement probability by 24 percent). In
some cases, SSW has a negative eﬀect on retirement. This is somewhat sur-
prising as it suggests that workers with higher levels of SSW tend to post-
pone retirement (i.e., have a taste for work) even after controlling for the
type of job and the occupational sector. However, the negative coeﬃcient
is hardly ever signiﬁcant.
A better grasp of the importance of the age eﬀects can be gained by look-
ing at ﬁgure 6.9. In the top part, we present results for the general model
with age dummies (M2). We plot the raw hazard computed in the estima-
tion sample versus the projected hazards both for men (left panel) and
women (right panel). The projected hazards are obtained, on the basis of
the general model M2 and for the baseline case, by setting the incentive
variables and all continuous variables to their mean value and setting to
zero all dummies, except the age dummies. The diﬀerent lines drawn for the
projected hazards on the same graph correspond to the diﬀerent incentive
measures.
Figure 6.10 compares the hazard function and the cumulative distribu-
tion function (CDF) of the raw data with those implied by our estimates of
model M2 (the baseline). The raw hazard and the raw CDF have a number
of interesting features. In particular, while the hazard shows signiﬁcant
spikes at age ﬁfty-ﬁve and sixty for men (more spikes for women), it is clear
from the CDF that half of the sample has already retired by age ﬁfty-seven
for men and by age ﬁfty-ﬁve for women. The results obtained for the two
models described above (models M1 and M2) suggest that the linear age
term does not capture the important spikes in the data, but the use of a full
set of age dummies provides an age proﬁle for the hazard that is fairly close
to the raw hazard, although at the cost of saturating the model.
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Fig. 6.9 Age eﬀects in model M2 and model M3
Note: The left panels are for men and the right panels for women. The continuous line is the
raw hazard. The estimated hazards are based (a) on the complete model M2 for each of the
incentive variable (top panels) and (b) on the parsimonious representation based on a cubic
in age plus the relevant dummies M3 (bottom panels). We convert in probability space the age
eﬀects for a representative worker. This worker is characterized by the mean values of con-
tinuous variables and zero for all the dummy variables (apart from age and age dummies). Re-
sults are based on estimation sample.
In order to separate the eﬀect of age on retirement due to preferences
from the age eﬀect related to incentives and to provide a parsimonious rep-
resentation of the age eﬀects, we carry out an additional probit analysis in
which we replace the linear age term by a combination of a cubic function
of age-plus-three dummies at ages ﬁfty-ﬁve, sixty, and sixty-ﬁve.31 This
model, which we call model M3, tries to capture the fact that the raw haz-
ard tends to increase smoothly with age, except for the presence of three
important spikes at ages ﬁfty-ﬁve, sixty, and sixty-ﬁve. We interpret the es-
timated cubic-age trend as the “pure” eﬀect of preferences on retirement.
The results of the probit analysis are not presented for the sake of brevity.
We simply note that the main results obtained for model M2 remain valid
for model M3 and that the age eﬀects are signiﬁcant overall. We use this
speciﬁcation M3 in two ways: (a) directly, to make projections on the basis
31. For women, only two age dummies at ﬁfty-ﬁve and sixty are added.of an “intermediate” speciﬁcation in simulating retirement decisions, and
(b) indirectly, to impose the estimated age eﬀect on the results of speciﬁca-
tion M2 in order to “purge” the eﬀect of age-preferences from the general
model M2.32 Results are described in ﬁgure 6.9 (bottom panels), where the
age eﬀects implied by model M3, along with the raw hazard, are graphed
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Fig. 6.10 Hazard and CDF: Raw data versus baseline estimates in model M2
Note: The top panels present the hazard functions while the bottom panels present the cor-
responding CDF. The results for the baseline are obtained from the general model M2. These
graphs are based on the estimation sample (7,446 observations for men and 1,770 observa-
tions for women) where individuals drop from the sample at the age of actual retirement. The
picture looks much diﬀerent for the simulation sample, where individuals are assumed to be
at risk up to a maximum age of seventy.
32. By intermediate speciﬁcation we mean one that models age in a satisfactory way with-
out saturating the model. In view of the 1995 reform, which tries to implement an actuarially
fair system, it would be reasonable to remove the three dummies and to allow the cubic spec-
iﬁcation in age to capture taste for retirement. However, in our sample, which does not cover
the postreform years, we have a basic identiﬁcation problem on the interpretation of the
spikes occurring at particular ages, as these may be mostly due to legislation but could also
emerge as a result of habits and peer eﬀects in retirement choices.against age for both men and women. This speciﬁcation ﬁts closely the age
pattern observed in the data, particularly for men.
6.5.2 Simulating Retirement Choices
We carry out simulations separately for men and women. This is done on
a simulation sample in which earnings are projected forward as well as
backward to cover the necessary time span, regardless of actual entry into
the sample and of possible gaps in earnings. In all cases, we maintain the
assumption that policy changes are not anticipated. We perform six types
of simulations based on three policy variants to be contrasted with the
baseline. The ﬁrst policy variant envisages a forward shift of three years in
the retirement ages. The second policy variant (referred to as the “common
reform”) consists of an actuarial adjustment of beneﬁts of 6 percent per
year and is designed to make early retirement costly to individuals. The last
variant is the actual 1995 reform of the Italian social security system.
Simulation S1 (Model M1)
Starting from the model, which only includes a linear age trend (model
M1), we project the estimated hazard on the simulation sample by chang-
ing the SSW and the incentive variables according to the chosen reform.
Results for men are shown in ﬁgure 6.11 (accrual and peak value) and the
left panels of ﬁgure 6.12(option value). The eﬀect of a policy change is sig-
niﬁcant only in the case of the accrual. The largest eﬀect is under the com-
mon reform. Results are not much diﬀerent for women (left panels of ﬁg-
ure 6.14).
Simulation S2 (Model M2)
Starting from the model with age dummies (model M2), we project the
estimated hazard by changing the incentive variables according to the cho-
sen reform while leaving all the other variables (including the age dum-
mies) unchanged. Since the model is saturated and the age dummies are
very important in explaining variability in retirement probabilities, this
case leaves little room for the eﬀects of policies. Results are shown for men
in ﬁgure 6.12 (right panels) and ﬁgure 6.13. The only case where the eﬀect
of a policy change is nonnegligible is for the accrual (ﬁgure 6.12 M2-S2 for
men and ﬁgure 6.14 for women).
Simulation S3 (Model M2)
Starting from the model with age dummies (model M2), we project the
estimated hazard by changing all the relevant variables (incentive variables
and age dummies) according to the policy change. In this experiment we
want to measure the impact of policies going through the incentives and
through a direct eﬀect of age, and hence it is important to net out the eﬀect
that age has on retirement due to individual preferences. To this end, in
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facto. For the policy entailing a three-year shift in retirement age, this fea-
ture is modeled in the incentive variables and subsequently imposed on the
age dummies (eﬀectively shifting the hazard to the right by three years). In
the case where the reform entails an actuarial adjustment by age, age-
dummy coeﬃcients are adjusted by assuming that the underlying hazard
should be smoother than the observed one. In order to impose this behav-
ior, we make use of the information obtained in model M3 and adjust the
age dummies according to a cubic function in age. The ﬁnal eﬀect of using
model M3 is to preserve the important breaking points while making the
rest of the simulated hazard smoother.
Results for men are presented in ﬁgures 6.15 (accrual and peak value)
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Fig. 6.11 Simulation M1-S1 for accrual and peak value, men
Note: The top panels show the hazards and the bottom panels the corresponding CDF. Re-
sults are obtained by using the coeﬃcients from the baseline M1 estimated on the estimation
sample of 7,446 men for each year and projected both on the baseline data and on the policy
simulation data.6.16(option value) and for women in ﬁgure 6.17(accrual only). The eﬀects
of policies are more marked than in the previous cases. In particular, both
policies imply a tendency to delay retirement, as it is clearly documented
by the CDF. The common reform has a stronger impact than the three-year
shift. It is also interesting to note that under the common reform, the ex-
post-facto adjustment of the age dummies smoothes out most spikes, leav-
ing only one important spike at age sixty.
Simulation S4 (Model M2)
In this simulation, we consider the eﬀects of the 1995 Dini reform de-
scribed in section 6.2. This reform is in many respects similar to the com-
mon reform, as it computes beneﬁts at each age according to an actuarial
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Fig. 6.12 Simulations M1-S1 for option value and M2-S2 for accrual, men
Note: The top panels show the hazards and the bottom panels the corresponding CDF. Re-
sults are obtained by using the coeﬃcients from the baseline M1 estimated on the estimation
sample of 7,446 men for each year and projected both on the baseline data and on the policy
simulation data.adjustment factor and restricts retirement ages to a window. For this sim-
ulation, we contrast the estimated hazard with the baseline by looking at
models M2 and M3 only. The results presented in ﬁgure 6.16 (right panels)
suggest that the incentive measures do not have a strong impact in this
case.
Simulation S5 (Model M3)
We look at the results obtained for the intermediate model M3 by con-
trasting the baseline and the policy changes. The assumption here is that
the age polynomial should capture only preferences. Results for men are
shown in ﬁgures 6.18 and 6.19. In particular, ﬁgure 6.18 and the left panel
of ﬁgure 6.19 present the two hypothetical reforms, while the right panels
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Fig. 6.13 Simulations M2-S2 for peak value and option value, men
Note: The top panels show the hazards and the bottom panels the corresponding CDF. Re-
sults are obtained by using the coeﬃcients from the baseline M1 estimated on the estimation
sample of 7,446 men for each year and projected both on the baseline data and on the policy
simulation data.of ﬁgure 6.19 are for the actual 1995 reform. When incentives are measured
by the accrual, there is a nonnegligible eﬀect towards delayed retirement
for both the common reform and the 1995 reform.
Finally, in ﬁgure 6.20we carry out an experiment (only by making use of
the accrual) that simulates the relevant policy changes on the basis of
model M3. This is done by applying the incentive variables of the three-
year adjustment and the common reform on the basis of coeﬃcients esti-
mated under speciﬁcation M3. At the same time, we shift forward the three
important spikes (age ﬁfty-ﬁve, sixty, and sixty-ﬁve) by three years, while
leaving the cubic polynomial in age in its original form. Figure 6.20 pres-
ents the results, it suggests that we obtain signiﬁcant changes in the hazard
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Fig. 6.14 Simulations M1-S1 and M2-S2 for accrual, women
Note: The top panels show the hazards and the bottom panels the corresponding CDF. Re-
sults are obtained by using the coeﬃcients from the baseline M1 and then M2 estimated on
the estimation sample of 1,770 women for each year and projected both on the baseline data
and on the policy simulation data.not only for the common reform, but also an impact on the CDF, leading
to a nonnegligible increase in mean retirement age (see table 6.10).
6.6 Conclusions
This paper analyses retirement behavior of Italian workers by ﬁrst esti-
mating probit models and then making use of the econometric model to
simulate exits from the labor force.
Results are mixed. The probit analysis provides, overall, a good ﬁt for the
estimated retirement hazards and the correct sign for the incentive vari-
ables (i.e., when the dynamic incentives increase workers tend to delay re-
tirement). When comparing the models with actual behavior, one sees that,
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Fig. 6.15 Simulations M2-S3 for accrual and peak value, men
Note: The top panels show the hazards and the bottom panels the corresponding CDF. Re-
sults are obtained by using the coeﬃcients from the baseline M1 estimated on the estimation
sample of 7,446 men for each year and projected both on the baseline data and on the policy
simulation data.despite the adequate ﬁt, all models tend to underestimate actual retire-
mentas measured by mean retirement age (see table 6.10 for men). However,
in this paper, the important comparison is between the baseline scenario
and the simulated reforms. The reforms are implemented in two steps: ﬁrst
by allowing only for a change in the incentives (SSW as well as dynamic
incentives) and then by looking at the full impact of the reforms through
eligibility. However, while the eﬀects of the reforms, as captured by the
incentive variables, are clearly seen on the hazard, these are not of a
signiﬁcant magnitude. Of the incentive variables, the most eﬀective is the
accrual, and in some cases (e.g., model M2, simulation S3), we can see a sub-
stantial change in the hazard caused by the policy change. In particular,
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Fig. 6.16 Simulations M2-S3 for option value and simulation M2-S4 based on the
legislation of the 1995 reform, men
Note: The top panels show the hazards and the bottom panels the corresponding CDF. Re-
sults are obtained by using the coeﬃcients from the baseline M2 estimated on the estimation
sample of 7,446 men for each year and projected both on the baseline data and on the policy
simulation data. The right panels refer to the reform enacted in Italy in 1995 known as the
Dini reform.Fig. 6.17 Simulations M2-M3 for accrual, women
Note: The top panels show the hazards and the bottom panels the corresponding CDF. Re-
sults are obtained by using the coeﬃcients from the baseline M1 and then M2 estimated on
the estimation sample of 1,770 women for each year and projected both on the baseline data
and on the policy simulation data.
Fig. 6.18 Simulation M3 based on a ﬂexible speciﬁcation of the age eﬀects, men
Notes: Results for the simulated hazards are obtained by using the coeﬃcients from the base-
line M3 estimated on the estimation sample of 7,664 men for each year. The left panel makes
use of the accrual value and the right panels of the peak value for the baseline and for the pol-
icy changes.both the hypothetical common reform (based on an actuarially-fair
scheme) and the actual 1995 reform show a clear move toward an age-
neutral system as opposed to the baseline scenario. However, this is not al-
ways suﬃcient to produce signiﬁcant changes in mean retirement age and
in the unconditional retirement probabilities as described by the CDF.
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Fig. 6.19 Simulation M3 based on a ﬂexible speciﬁcation of the age eﬀects, men
Note: Results for the simulated hazards are obtained by using the coeﬃcients from the base-
line M3 estimated on the sample of 7,664 men for each year. The left panel makes use of the
option value for the standard reforms and the right panels make use of the accrual value for
the 1995 reform.Fig. 6.20 Simulation M3 based on ﬂexible speciﬁcation of the age eﬀects
Note:The left panels are for men and the right panels for women. Results for the simulated haz-
ards are obtained by using the coeﬃcients from the baseline M3. In this model, we shift the three
important dummies by three years in order to impose an age eﬀect due to the policy change.
Table 6.10 Estimated Mean Retirement Age of Men (estimation sample: N   7,664)
Baseline Three-Year Reform Common Reform 1995 Reform
M1-S1-ACC 55.23 55.23 55.24 55.43
M1-S1-Peak V 55.26 55.19 55.25 55.19
M1-S1-OV 55.28 55.18 55.16 54.95
M2-S2-ACC 55.97 56.01 55.81 55.71
M2-S2-Peak V 55.92 55.93 55.80 55.92
M2-S2-OV 55.93 55.97 55.94 55.81
M2-S3-ACC 58.35 58.45 58.41 58.58
M2-S3-Peak V 58.40 58.42 58.32 58.43
M2-S3-OV 58.43 58.45 58.66 58.38
M3-ACC 55.71 55.70 55.74 55.90
M3-S5-ACC 55.84 55.88
Notes: Sample mean retirement age = 56.63. ACC   accrual value; OV   option value. Unconditional
mean retirement age is based on the CDF corresponding to each case (for example, M2-S3-OV gives the
mean retirement age corresponding to the simulated retirement probabilities based on model M2, pol-
icy S3, when the incentive variable is the option value). For model M3, case S5, ACC, mean retirement
ages for the baseline and the 1995 reform are not shown as the eligibility rules of these cases are not co-
herent with the policy change under investigation. Blank cells indicate that no calculation was done in
that case.Micro-Modeling of Retirement Behavior in Italy 395
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Age SSW Median 10% 90% SD Tax/Subsidy Observations Volume
Baseline (Transition) Case
53 0 0 0 0 1.20 0 712
54 112.48 0 –4.60 .051 6.40 0 641
55 129.96 –1.00 –7.68 0 6.50 .102 600 .282
56 135.52 –1.25 –7.69 .082 7.04 .124 516 .301
57 142.30 –2.61 –16.78 .867 8.48 .287 466 .326
58 137.97 –2.66 –16.19 .666 8.48 .298 405 .356
59 134.32 –3.69 –13.40 0 7.10 .403 333 .378
60 129.30 –9.76 –21.44 –1.86 11.075 1.634 279 .623
61 128.73 –4.42 –23.55 –.111 13.54 .528 110 .632
62 126.19 –4.87 –23.23 0.983 11.82 .591 69 .633
63 124.46 –4.96 –23.037 –1.00 10.80 .628 46 .638
64 120.36 –4.49 –20.233 1.63 17.15 .487 32 .648
65 101.24 –4.91 –20.94 –1.99 13.32 0.923 39 .651
Post-1995 (DINI) Case
53 0 0 0 0 0 0 712
54 0 0 0 0 0 0 641
55 0 0 0 0 0 0 600
56 0 0 0 0 0 0 516
57 116.62 0.33 –1.065 4.43 3.41 –.034 466
58 115.51 1.42 –1.195 7.23 5.19 –.111 405
59 114.48 –.59 –2.00 2.90 4.06 .063 333
60 112.90 –1.23 –2.59 2.24 4.62 .154 279
61 117.25 –.775 –2.69 6.64 6.60 .123 110
62 114.98 .084 –1.08 13.94 7.13 .009 69
63 111.96 .065 –.93 24 8.29 –.006 46
64 117.41 .132 –.94 15.49 8.19 –.015 32
65 95.36 –2.18 –3.14 1.09 1.56 .256 39
Simulation (3-year Increment)
53 0 0 0 0 0 0 712
54 0 0 0 0 0 0 641
55 0 0 0 0 0 0 600
56 0 0 0 0 0 0 516
57 129.25 –.504 –5.69 0 5.53 .057 466
58 128.65 –1.37 –6.94 0 5.71 .136 405
59 126.59 –2.72 –8.25 0 5.57 .338 333
60 126.83 –8.41 –19.72 0 8.71 1.21 279
61 127.18 –4.27 –21.99 0 10.45 .496 110
62 120.34 –4.6 –23.23 0 8.36 .591 69
63 124.46 –4.18 –21.29 –1.00 9.67 .496 46
64 120.85 –4.49 –20.23 1.64 14.59 .500 32




Age SSW Median 10% 90% SD Tax/Subsidy Observations Volume
Common Reform (Act. Adjustment)
53 0 0 0 0 0 0 712
54 0 0 0 0 0 0 641
55 0 0 0 0 0 0 600
56 0 0 0 0 0 0 516
57 0 0 0 0 0 0 466
58 0 0 0 0 0 0 405
59 0 0 0 0 0 0 333
60 83.88 –2.18 –11.30 5.69 6.94 .652 279
61 94.64 –.356 –18.93 7.44 11.51 .035 110
62 100.14 –.623 –10.53 6.18 13.27 .064 69
63 105.87 –.602 –8.97 24.11 12.52 .063 46
64 105.12 –1.259 –11.06 3.79 13.80 .119 32
65 89.84 –2.02 –13.71 6.80 10.41 .352 39
Peak Value Option Value
Median 10% 90% SD Median 10% 90% SD
Baseline (Transition) Case
53 147.90 69.35 187.01 54.86 301.17 114.81 531.27 219.23
54 3.27 –4.61 174.19 83.58 143.20 48.06 477.51 234.33
55 –.659 –7.15 176.58 85.00 123.77 11.68 474.82 231.79
56 –1.17 –7.69 178.90 81.57 112.70 20.86 450.28 206.05
57 –2.58 –15.44 64.90 47.49 99.78 12.75 248.62 140.10
58 –2.66 –16.11 41.13 44.33 89.48 –1.29 246.70 145.95
59 –3.56 –13.40 14.46 45.34 79.33 –2.53 221.00 154.66
60 –9.76 –21.44 –1.76 15.61 –0.825 –22.6 143.92 125.00
61 –4.42 –23.55 2.49 18.97 53.27 –25.63 254.06 164.45
62 –4.68 –23.23 1.83 14.49 51.99 –20.24 366.24 165.17
63 –4.96 –23.04 –1.00 14.00 45.16 –24.30 428.20 171.61
64 –4.49 –20.23 –2.85 18.72 45.20 –6.4 136.25 125.76
65 –5.24 –23.47 –1.99 14.54 10.01 –25.09 81.99 54.87
1995 Reform Case
53 123.39 92.12 182.56 63.2 334.11 171.18 598.8 248.99
54 121.76 88.57 177.31 61.52 325.63 156.24 567.08 235.53
55 120.33 88.40 173.22 65.30 309.88 153.79 549.60 231.53
56 119.27 85.38 169.36 66.59 300.34 159.76 538.11 213.15
57 5.72 –.94 58.08 34.45 157.37 47.52 322.79 154.98
58 4.53 –1.17 57.38 5.715 142.32 38.39 298.18 164.90
59 –.485 –1.96 60.29 31.86 128.35 28.38 255.88 163.95
60 –1.14 –2.56 52.94 31.08 51.42 3.70 230.24 160.40
61 –.246 –2.70 60.33 34.84 95.46 –1.91 373.90 205.02
62 .425 –1.08 56.27 29.00 94.09 3.04 551.25 206.55
63 .161 –.938 56.48 24.06 81.32 6.90 601.55 208.60
64 .132 –.94 35.13 14.40 68.84 16.25 397.06 161.15
65 –2.18 –3.14 2.52 2.17 33.55 –3.00 110.98 78.62References
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